Abstract
All
airline pilots are required to receive crew resource management
(CRM) training, which augments technical flight and ground
training with human factors subjects. There has also been an
increase in this type of training for flight attendants. CRM
training has been shown to be efficacious for both groups when
viewed separately. Unfortunately, in real flight operations,
there are cognitive and physical factors that cause these
disparate groups to work less than efficiently between
their groups, particularly when a cohesive environment is
critical, such as in an emergency. This paper looks at the
factors that influence the separation of these two groups and
offers recommendations to address this critical
issue.
Introduction
Today's flight and cabin crews are much different than they were
during the early years of commercial aviation. The captain of
the aircraft was once considered "God" and his
decisions were always the "right" ones. There was
little, if any, input from the other pilots because they assumed
the captain knew what he was doing. It was also considered
somewhat disrespectful to question the decisions of a superior.
Part of this thinking had its genesis from the military. At one
time the military was the biggest producer of pilots, and along
with military training came a good dose of machismo, ego, and
autocratic decision-making processes (many military fighters
were single pilot aircraft and therefore lacked the redundancy
of, and decision inputs from, another crewmember). This attitude
did not transfer well into civilian cockpits. The problems began
to manifest in pilot error related airline accidents that
claimed hundreds of lives:
- 1978, United 171 ran out of
fuel over Portland, Oregon and no one noticed until it
was too late.
- 1972, Eastern 401 gradually
descended into the Everglades as all three crewmembers
became fixated on a landing light indication and the
autopilot became disengaged.
- 1982, Air Florida 90 was not
properly de-iced and crashed shortly after takeoff from
Washington, D.C. In addition, standard operating procedures
were violated by an inexperienced flight crew.
- 1985, Delta 191 was caught in
an unreported windshear on final approach to the Dallas/Fort
Worth airport.
It was obvious that something needed to be done to address the
human aspect of flying an aircraft. Airlines were noticing that
although pilots were technically competent, their people skills
were deficient. In other words, the captain could fly a perfect
Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach, but could not work in
a synergistic environment to effectively accomplish tasks. This
can create a potentially dangerous and antagonistic situation.
Approximately 25 years ago, one major airline took notice and
began implementing "people skills" training as part of
technical flight training. It became known as Crew Resource
Management (CRM). Formerly known as Cockpit Resource
Management, CRM has its roots at United Airlines, where in
1980, a formal training program was set up to concentrate on
human factors in the cockpit. The reason for the change from
"cockpit" to "crew" resource management
training was because the training eventually branched out to
include not only the pilots but also flight attendants,
mechanics, dispatchers, management personnel, or in fact anyone
who had a responsibility for the safe completion of a flight.
CRM, amongst other things, teaches pilots how to improve
communication, prioritize tasks, delegate authority, and monitor
automated equipment. United Airlines established their CRM
program when it was not mandated by regulation. Based on
United's model, other airlines quickly followed suit. Today, CRM
is required training for all airline operations, as per Advisory
Circular 120-51D (FAA, 2001). It should be noted that CRM
training, as of the publication of this paper, is not
mandatory training for charter operations requiring two pilots.
Therefore, many operators of business jets for private charter
are not currently required to, nor have voluntarily adopted, a
CRM training program for their pilots or support personnel. The
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 2002), the
government agency that investigates accidents, made a
recommendation to the FAA (the only agency that can promulgate
new aviation rules and regulations) that CRM becomes mandatory
training for charter operators. The 2002 recommendation came in
the light of the tragic crash of a Gulfstream III in Aspen,
Colorado in 2001, where, after a thorough investigation, the
NTSB cited the following as causal factors in the accident:
- The captain did not discuss
the instrument approach procedure, the missed approach
procedure, and other required elements during his approach
briefing because he expected to execute a visual approach to
the airport.
- The captain and the first
officer did not make required instrument approach callouts,
and the first officer did not call out required course, fix,
and altimeter information.
- The flight crew did not
discuss a missed approach after receiving a third report of
a missed approach to the airport and a report of
deteriorating visibility in the direction of the approach
course.
(Source: NTSB, 2002, Accident Report # DCA01MA034)
The
Board's 2002 recommendation to the FAA read as follows:
The
National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal
Aviation Administration: Revise 14 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Part 135 to require on-demand charter
operators that conduct operations with aircraft requiring two or
more pilots to establish a Federal Aviation
Administration-approved crew resource management training
program for their flight crews in accordance with 14 CFR Part
121, subparts N and O. (A-02-12).
(Source:
NTSB, 2002, Safety Recommendation A-02-12)
Unfortunately, as of this writing, the FAA has not adopted the
NTSB recommendation and aircraft charter operators are currently
not required to provide CRM training. Since the rejection of the
recommendation, another high profile accident has taken the life
of Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota). Again, the NTSB cited
inadequate CRM training as a causal factor in the 2002 accident
(NTSB, 2003, Accident Report # AAR-03/03).
Along
with the NTSB, this author has been passionate about an
adaptation of CRM training for aircraft charter operators. Only
time will tell...
Pilots
vs. Flight Attendants?
We will now shift away from charter operations and shift back to
the discussion of airline operations, which will be the focus of
the rest of this paper. When CRM began to expand out of the
cockpit and into the rest of the aircraft, the flight attendants
were the next logical part of the crew to be included in the CRM
training plan.
The role of a flight attendant has changed significantly since
the "glory days" of flying. The very first
"flight attendants" were three 14-year old cabin boys,
who were hired by Great Britain's Daimler Airways in 1922 (Orlady
& Orlady, 1999, p.374). Passenger service, rather than
safety, was the primary reason these "airborne
bellboys" were included on the flight. Food and beverage
service was not offered on these first flights. Apparently, the
reason for these boys to be in the cabin was more for aesthetics
rather than functionality. Things would soon change.
In 1930, United Airlines set a new precedent for cabin crew
personnel. United began to hire "stewardesses" for all
of their flights. These stewardesses had to be attractive,
single, and registered nurses. They also had to be less than 25
years of age (p.374). Many of these stewardesses were glamorous
and added to the charm of flying. Keep in mind that flying in
this time period was reserved for the well to do. Flights were
considered a luxury and there was actually a dress code for
passengers in the early to middle years of commercial air
transportation. During the rapid expansion of air transportation
after 1930, the role of the stewardess slowly began to evolve
into safety and comfort for the passengers.
Today, stewardesses are known as flight attendants and their
role has changed even further. Safety is now the number one
priority for all airlines. Passenger service is second on the
list. Flight attendants no longer have an age restriction nor
are they required to be registered nurses. Gender issues have
also been resolved. In fact, approximately 20% of flight
attendants today are males (p.375).
Today's flight attendants are highly trained, highly skilled,
and center on safety as the core of their job function. And,
just like the pilots, many have been trained in crew resource
management principles. However, some recent findings have
uncovered some disturbing facts about the division of
responsibilities and safety issues between the cockpit
(pilots) and the cabin crew (flight attendants). The underlying
goal for both the pilots and flight attendants is the safe and
efficient completion of a flight. Yet, there has been an
unrelenting division of these groups in times of emergencies as
well as routine operations. How could this be? As a layperson,
you would assume that these groups would be highly cohesive by
nature, and yet the opposite has been shown to be true.
On
a snowy winter afternoon [in 1989], the crew of Air Ontario
Flight 1363 attempted a takeoff from Dryden, Ontario, with an
accumulation of snow and ice on the wings and crashed because
the aircraft could not gain enough lift to clear tress beyond
the end of the runway In the crash and resulting fire, 24
passengers and crewmembers, including both pilots, were killed (Helmreich
& Foushee, 1993).
During
CFONF’s [aircraft registration number] stop at Dryden snow was
falling and accumulating on the wings. The First Officer
(FO) commented on the radio at 1200 [12:00 noon local time], “quite
puffy snow looks like it's going to be a heavy one” (Helmreich,
1992). It was during this time and when the aircraft began to
taxi that several passengers commented to the Flight Attendants
(FA) about the contamination on the wings. An experienced
pilot “expressed his concerns about icing to the lead flight
attendant but was told (falsely) that the aircraft had automatic
de-icing equipment” (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). The FA’s
did not inform the flightcrew of the expressed concerns of the
passengers for de-icing (Helmreich, 1992). [Bracketed items
added for clarity].
In another example of a breakdown between these two groups, a
1986 accident report of an Air Canada DC-9 illustrates another
problem in the communication process. Just as in the Air Ontario
accident, the lack of information dissemination between the
flight attendants and the pilots contributed to the loss of 23
of the 46 lives onboard.
A total of four minutes were wasted between the initial report
of a fire being made to the captain and the commencement of an
emergency descent (FSF, 1990). The flight attendant who first
discovered the fire made an attempt to extinguish it, but due to
the volume of smoke, she was not able to located the source. She
then requested to another flight attendant that a report be made
to the purser. The purser, in turn, was only able to report to
the captain that a fire had been discovered in the lavatory but
was not able to articulate the details such as the extent of the
flames and smoke or the exact origin of the fire (FSF, 1990).
The report also indicated that the captain did not appear to be
too concerned with the problem.
The four-minute delay between the recognition of the problem and
the start of the emergency descent to the nearest airport by the
flight crew came at the expense of 23 lives. This example once
again shows how important the line of communication is between
the pilots and flight attendants, particularly in emergency
situations. The information needs to be timely and accurate so
the pilots can make an informed assessment and begin remedial
processes as soon as possible.
The process may also work in reverse (cockpit to cabin). In this
example the outcome is successful but the breakdown in
communication and teamwork may demonstrate a less than adequate
example of human performance:
Abnormal
Situation: Hydraulic System B failure on climb out.
Flight Engineer brought problem to captain's attention. I
(F/O) continued to fly aircraft while the Capt and F/E
worked the checklist. So, all is well and pretty good
CRM going on the flight deck. However, we failed to
communicate problem with the lead flight attendant, who with 1
or 2 other F/As detected (sounds) that there was a
problem. The captain made the decision to return to the
departure airport, yet the flight deck still failed to
communicate this decision effectively with the lead flight
attendant.
Once
on the ground we communicated the nature and extent of the
problem with the lead flight attendant who said that she
had been left "out of the loop", and therefore could
not communicate effectively with the other F/As. Flight
crew agreed that [we] "dropped the ball" and
apologized, but we all agreed that we learned a valuable lesson;
always think of CRM extending beyond the flight deck.
(Anonymous, personal communication, September 14, 2004).
Outcomes are not always negative, however. As a Japan Airlines
flight was beginning its descent toward Narita, a fire broke out
in the right rear coatroom (FSF, 1990). Two flight attendants
began fighting the fire while the third informed the purser who
informed the pilots. The captain immediately declared an
emergency and sent an off-duty flight engineer into the cabin to
help. The fire was quickly extinguished, passengers were
relocated, and a successful landing was made with no injuries (FSF,
1990). The crew's timely and coordinated efforts showed
how a synergistic environment could have a positive outcome in
an abnormal situation. The crew was later commended by the
ministry of transportation (FSF, 1990).
What's
the Problem?
The problem with pilot and flight attendant teamwork,
particularly in the area of communications, has its roots in the
disparate job functions of both groups. When speaking of pilots,
it is a mostly male dominated profession. Conversely, when
speaking of flight attendants, it is a mostly female dominated
profession. It should be noted, however, that there has been an
increased percentage of "gender balancing" over the
last few decades for both groups. Theoretically speaking, and
this comes from basic innate gender characteristics, male and
female thought processes could be somewhat divergent. This is
not to say that there is an abundance of testosterone in the
cockpit or that females may be influenced by their inherent
affective nature, but the gender differences do have to be
considered when groups are segregated into mostly male versus
mostly female categories.
Besides gender influences, the most salient reason for division
in these groups appears to lie in the division of job functions
and responsibilities. The cockpit crew is separated from the
cabin crew by not only physical barriers (the door), but also
communicative barriers (most communication is conducted through
an impersonal interphone). Until relatively recently, pilots
considered the cockpit "their territory" while the
flight attendants considered the cabin "their
territory." Typically, the only times that these two groups
would interface was when the pilots needed to be fed, or in the
event of an emergency.
Research shows that the division in these groups may be
attributable to historical, organizational, environmental,
psychosocial, and regulatory factors (Chute & Wiener, 1995).
The investigation of the Air Ontario crash discussed earlier in
this paper gave us more than the cause of the accident; it
established the foundation of factors in play that extend far
beyond the cockpit and the pilots. Among these findings was a
serious separation of the pilots and flight attendants. Chute
and Wiener (1995) summed the results very eloquently by saying
"the basic problem is that these two crews represent two
distinct and separate cultures, and that this separation serves
to inhibit satisfactory teamwork." Supporting this
hypothesis was compelling testimony from the surviving flight
attendant of the Air Ontario crash:
Well,
we have - the pilots and the flight attendants have respect
amongst one another as friends but when it comes to working as a
crew, we don't work as a crew. We work as two crews. You have a
front-end crew and a back-end crew, and we are looked upon as
serving coffee and lunch and things like that.
(Sonia
Hartwick, surviving flight attendant, Air Ontario accident,
Dryden). (Cited in Chute & Wiener, 1995).
The separation of pilots and flight attendants was further
widened by two additional factors; the 1981 promulgation of the
"sterile cockpit rule" by the FAA (Federal Aviation
Regulation 121.542), and the 2001 cockpit door-strengthening
requirement brought about by the events of 9/11. While both of
these regulations were needed to enhance safety, the unfortunate
side effects manifest as a barrier to effective communication
between the groups.
The sterile cockpit rule was implemented to eliminate
non-essential chatter between the pilots during critical phases
of flight. A 1974 accident investigation by the NTSB revealed
that distractions and discussions of non-relevant flight issues
were causal factors leading to the crash of Eastern Airlines
Flight 212 in Charlotte, North Carolina (NTSB, 1974). In that
crash, 71 of 82 people lost their lives because the pilots were
discussing politics rather than the plans for their approach to
Charlotte Douglas Airport in bad weather. The new rule was to
prevent this type of non-essential chatter below 10,000 feet and
reads as follows:
Sec. 121.542 Flight crewmember duties.
(a) No certificate holder shall require, nor may any flight
crewmember perform, any duties during a critical phase of flight except
those duties required for the safe operation of the aircraft. Duties
such as company required calls made for such nonsafety related purposes
as ordering galley supplies and confirming passenger connections,
announcements made to passengers promoting the air carrier or pointing
out sights of interest, and filling out company payroll and related
records are not required for the safe operation of the aircraft.
(b) No flight crewmember may engage in, nor may any pilot in command
permit, any activity during a critical phase of flight which could
distract any flight crewmember from the performance of his or her duties
or which could interfere in any way with the proper conduct of those
duties. Activities such as eating meals, engaging in nonessential
conversations within the cockpit and nonessential communications between
the cabin and cockpit crews, and reading publications not related to the
proper conduct of the flight are not required for the safe operation of
the aircraft.
(c) For the purposes of this section, critical phases of flight
includes all ground operations involving taxi, takeoff and landing, and
all other flight operations conducted below 10,000 feet, except cruise
flight.
Note: Taxi is defined as ``movement of an airplane under its own
power on the surface of an airport.''
[Doc. No. 20661, 46 FR 5502, Jan. 19, 1981]
(Source: U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access, 2004, 14CFR121.542).
The rule is self-explanatory; the pilots should not be doing
anything not related to the flight tasks at hand. This includes
the taxi portion as well as operations below 10,000 ft, except
cruise flight if the final altitude will be less than 10,000 ft.
In this author's opinion, the sterile cockpit rule has had mixed
results. Numerous post-crash cockpit voice recordings (CVR's) to
date still indicate an abundance of non-essential chatter by the
pilots, particularly during the taxi phase. It should also be
noted that flight attendants are included in the sterile cockpit
rule. Flight attendants must be seated in their jumpseats and
remain seated until the captain signals (usually with a chime)
that the "sterile" portion of the flight is complete.
Just like the pilots, the flight attendants are not allowed to
perform any non-essential duties such as distributing blankets,
preparing meals, or serving beverages or food.
The problem therefore manifests in the cabin crew not wanting to
"bother" the pilots during a critical portion of the
flight; even if he or she feels that the matter is critical. The
flight attendant must use discretion in deciding what is
critical and what is not. The obvious dichotomy is that if the
flight attendant calls the cockpit and he or she is wrong, there
may be repercussions from the pilots, management, or both. On
the other hand, if there is a serious issue and it is not
communicated to the pilots the same results may ensue.
To further confound the issue of the sterile cockpit rule, crash
statistics indicate that 80 percent of accidents involving
commercial aircraft occur within the period of time that the
sterile cockpit rule is in effect (FSF, 1990). In other words,
during the takeoff and landing phase, where the majority of
accidents occur, communication between the cockpit and cabin
crew needs to be at its best. However, the opposite is often
true.
Because of the ambiguity of "what should be
communicated" between the two groups, Japan Airlines (JAL)
in 1987 revised their flight attendant training manual to
include items that are considered "essential
communication" during takeoff and landing that may
necessitate an emergency evacuation of the aircraft (FSF, 1990).
These "essentials" included:
·
Any outbreak of fire
·
The presence of smoke in the
cabin
·
Any abnormality in the
attitude of the aircraft during takeoff or landing
·
The existence of any
abnormal noise or vibration, and
·
The observation of any fuel
or other leakages
(Source:
FSF, 1990)
The JAL training also included important information regarding when
to make the calls to the pilots: "Cabin crews are to make
an immediate emergency call upon discovery of any
abnormality." What to call: "Even in
circumstances where you are not absolutely sure, make the
call," and how to call: "Use the pilot
call for emergency communication." (FSF, 1990). Other
airlines have instituted similar training modifications and they
appear to be welcomed by both groups.
The second critical issue involves the door-strengthening
requirement that was prompted by the events of 9/11. While the
communications problems regarding the sterile cockpit are more
or less cognitively based, the fortification of the cockpit door
serves as a physical barrier. While there is no doubt that the
doors needed to be strengthened against unauthorized entry, it
also further separated the cockpit and cabin crews. Other than
an emergency in the cabin, the days of the pilots walking down
the aisle for a leisurely stroll are long gone. In fact, many
airlines require a flight attendant to "keep watch"
outside the forward lavatory when a pilot requires a
"physiological break." Other than that, all
communication is conducted through an interphone, and of course
these types of communications are subject to interference from
noise, vibration, etc. While it is absolutely necessary to be
closed and locked throughout the duration of the flight, the
cockpit door still presents itself as a physical barrier to two
groups that must have open communication.
Conclusion
By now you have seen the magnitude of the problem; two groups,
two cultures, and two completely separate job functions. The
pilots, who work in the small but highly complex cockpit—and
the flight attendants, who come from the service-oriented and
spacious cabin—having difficulties bringing their environments
closer together and working in harmony.
The recommendations set forth by Chute and Wiener (1996) offer
an excellent starting point. They include:
·
Clarification of the Sterile
Cockpit Rule/Reexamine Teaching of Sterile Cockpit Rule
·
Team Formation and Crew
Briefings
·
Aircraft Technical Training
for Flight Attendants
·
Jumpseat Familiarization
Flights for Cabin Crews
·
Integrated CRM Courses that
Include Pilots and Flight Attendants
(Source: Chute and Wiener, 1996)
It is important that both pilots and flight attendants
understand the importance of the sterile cockpit rule. The rule
was put in place not to disrupt the flow of critical
flight information, but to mitigate the abundance of
non-essential chatter in the cockpit. Additional training should
be included, such as that of Japan Airlines, that would
emphasize what communications are appropriate during the times
when the sterile cockpit rule is in effect. Apparently, the
sterile cockpit rule is becoming better and better understood as
illustrated by this testament from a pilot of a small domestic
airline:
We
observe the "sterile cockpit" rule. Our flight
attendants are great with this!! They will only call after
they have received the message "Departure Checks"
when climbing through 10,000 feet. On arrival and
descending through 10,000 feet the flight attendants will get
the message "Arrival Checks." As I have said all
of the flight attendants are good at observing this
rule. If the flight attendants have a genuine concern
during the "sterile cockpit phase" they will call; the
majority have no problem calling if they feel there is a
problem. I can say that we do not have a problem with
flight attendants making unnecessary calls to the flight deck.
(Anonymous, personal communication, September 14, 2004).
Pilots and flight attendants need to understand the basic
psychology of group dynamics and the positive effect that
pre-flight briefings can have between groups. Many pilots and
flight attendants may have never worked together before and yet
both of these groups tend to remain isolated before, during, and
after a flight. Some captains are better with an introduction
and a briefing than others. But overall, there tends to be a
"chill in the air" during pre-flight routines. The
importance of an introduction and briefing cannot be overstated;
a simple handshake or congenial gesture may be all that is
required to build trust and camaraderie (Burgoon, 1991). Without
trust, how can these two groups have effective communication? In
terms of briefings, it is understood that there is a shortage of
time for "socializing," but a simple briefing by the
captain to the cabin crew is a sign of goodwill and teamwork.
Unfortunately, many captains only provide weather-related
briefings to the cabin crew as a courtesy for possible delays,
but whether this type of brief builds trust or camaraderie is
questionable.
The suggestion that flight attendants receive some technical
training is a valid point. Learning basic aerodynamic
principles as well as being able to identify major parts
of the aircraft is well worth the additional training hours.
Flight attendants should at least be able to identify the wing
components such as the flaps, slats, slots, spoilers, and
ailerons, as well as the vertical and horizontal stabilizers. In
an emergency situation, when the pilots cannot come to the
cabin, a quick and accurate assessment may need to be made by
the flight attendant as he or she communicates the problem to
the cockpit via the interphone. Ambiguities in wording may also
be incorporated into this type of training. An example would be
if a flight attendant reports a fuel leak on the
"left" wing. Depending on which way the flight
attendant is facing (forward or rearward), either wing can be
the "left" wing.
Jumpseat familiarization flights are a cost-effective way to
allow the cabin crew to "see the cockpit in action."
This allows the flight attendants, typically on a day off, the
opportunity to sit in the cockpit and observe the pilots work
during the course of a flight. The thought is that with a better
understanding of what is required of the pilots, particularly in
high workload situations, flight attendants will have a better
idea of "what is going on behind that locked cockpit
door" and therefore have a deeper understanding and
appreciation of the other group. Unfortunately, since Chute and
Wiener's paper in 1996, the events of 9/11 have put many
limitations on the use of this practice. On the other hand,
pilots regularly get to observe flight attendants in the cabin
(many "commute" to work via an airline flight or
travel by air for vacations). This gives the pilots many
opportunities to observe the job requirements of the other
group.
Chute and Wiener's final recommendation that CRM classes be
combined between both groups speaks for itself. There is no
doubt that the efficacy of this type of training will be best
when both groups are able to interact with each other. Problems
that are detected in the CRM class can be more easily resolved
in the classroom than in a real life emergency. And rather than
both groups receiving their CRM training separately and hoping
for a "happy meeting" down the line, they will be able
to learn under the same roof and there will hopefully be a
higher level of standardization in the transfer to the line.
In addition to the recommendations outlined by Chute and Wiener,
the author recommends investigating a few other areas. Further
elucidation of the psychosocial problem could be addressed by
the use of group training, with an emphasis on assertiveness
training. Although the topic of assertiveness is
generally included in basic CRM modules, a stand-alone course
that includes more in-depth content on role-playing and case
studies may have a higher amount of retention and transfer for
the cabin crew. The author feels that flight attendants could
benefit from assertiveness training because of the inherent
hierarchical composition of the aircrew. It is not always easy
for a first officer to speak up to a captain, let alone a flight
attendant having to speak up to one of the pilots. Assertiveness
training is effective in teaching people how to speak up with
the right words at the right time, even if their personality is
considered timid or quiet.
Finally, the author recommends that a few "flight attendant
sterile cockpit scenarios" be added to recurrent simulator
training for pilots. These scenarios could be invoked during
normal training sessions during taxi out, climbout, approach, or
taxi-in. This should not incur any additional training costs
since the pilots would be in training anyway. Although the
simulator instructor could assume the role of the flight
attendant, the best method would be the utilization of real
flight attendants. A simulated scenario could consist of a call
from the flight attendant during taxi that there is a strong
smell of raw fuel in the cabin. The pilots would then have to
make decisions amongst themselves and with the flight attendants
for seeking resolution to the problem (i.e., Do we go back to
the gate? Do we continue? Did we notice those odors on the last
leg?). Other scenarios for the airborne segments should also be
incorporated. If nothing else, these types of scenarios would
further reinforce the importance of communication and synergy
between the pilots and flight attendants.
References
Burgoon, J. K. (1991). Relational message interpretations of
touch, conversational distance, and posture. Journal of
Nonverbal Behavior, 15 (4), 233-259.
Chute,
R. D., & Wiener, E. L. (1995). Cockpit/cabin communication:
I. A tale of two cultures. In The International Journal of
Aviation Psychology, 5 (3), 257-276.
Chute,
R. D., & Wiener, E. L. (1996). Cockpit/cabin communication:
II. Shall we tell the pilots? In The International Journal of
Aviation Psychology, 6 (3), 211-231.
Federal
Aviation Administration. (2001). Crew resource management
advisory circular 120-51D. [Electronic version]. Retrieved
September 5, 2004 from http://www.faa.gov/avr/afs/acs/120-51d.pdf
Flight
Safety Foundation. (1990, January/February). Communication from
the cabin crew to the cockpit crew. Cabin Crew Safety.
Helmreich,
R.L. (1992). Human factors of the Air Ontario crash at Dryden
Ontario: Analysis and recommendations. In V.P. Moshanshy
(Commissioner), Commission of Inquiry into the Air Ontario Crash
at Dryden, Ontario: Final Report. Technical appendices. Ottawa,
ON: Minister of Supply and Services, Canada.
Helmreich,
R. L., & Foushee, H.C. (1993). Why crew resource management?
Empirical and theoretical bases of human factors training in
aviation. In E. Wiener, R. Helmreich and B. Kanki (Eds.), Cockpit
resource management. (3-45) San Diego, CA USA: Academic
Press.
National
Transportation Safety Board. (1974). Aircraft accident brief #
DCA75AZ009. [Electronic version]. Retrieved September 4, 2004
from http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=87041&key=0
National
Transportation Safety Board. (2002). Safety recommendation
A-02-12. [Electronic version]. Retrieved July 8, 2004 from http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2002/a02_12.pdf
National
Transportation Safety Board. (2002). Aircraft accident brief #
DCA01MA034. [Electronic version]. Retrieved August 12, 2004 from
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2002/AAB0203.htm
National
Transportation Safety Board. (2003). Aircraft accident report #
AAR-03/03. [Electronic
version]. Retrieved September 5, 2004 from
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2003/AAR0303.htm
Orlady,
H. W., & Orlady, L. M. (1999). Human factors in
multi-crew flight operations. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate.
United
States Government Printing Office. (2004). Federal aviation
regulation [FAR 14CFR121.542]. [Electronic version, via GPO
access]. Retrieved August 15, 2004 from http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.
gov/cfr_2003/14cfr121.542.htm
|